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INSURANCE LAW IN MISSOURI-1957*
ROBERT E. SEILER**
In 1957 the supreme court passed on three cases involving primarily
substantive questions of insurance law, one of these being a case of first
impression.
Readenour v. Motor Ins. Corp.' deals with the question of insurance
agents and insurance brokers. The question was whether a farm imple-
ment dealer, Lewis, who also wrote insurance was defendant's agent so
that through him the insurance company had knowledge the combine in
question was covered by a mortgage. Lewis testified that in addition to
carrying on the implement business (he sold the combine to plaintiff) he
had an insurance business, that he wrote insurance for the defendant and
"issued" the original policy and notified plaintiff each year when the
time was up, that plaintiff would then authorize him to renew the insur-
ance, that he (Lewis) collected the premium, sent it to defendant and
received a conmmission on all policies issued. The majority of the court
held this evidence was sufficient to justify the trial court in holding Lewis
was the agent of the insurance company and in reforming the policy to
show the existence of the mortgage. This would appear to be in accord
with the general rule that knowledge acquired by a soliciting agent on a
point such as the existence of a chattel mortgage is sufficient to create a
waiver or estoppel binding on the company. Judge Hyde dissented
(Judge Eager concurring) on the ground that since Lewis did not
countersign the policy, had no authority to do so, merely took information
from the person seeking a policy and sent it to the company, which some-
times sent the policy to Lewis to deliver and sometimes sent it directly to
the company, and Lewis collected and remitted the premium, without
retaining any portion, that Lewis was a broker and the case should be
remanded to develop whether he was representing the insurer or the
insured, and also to develop matters pertaining to reformation of the
policy and waiver by failure to tender premiums.
*This Article contains a discussion of selected 1957 Missouri court decisions.
**Attorney, Joplin, Missouri; LL.B., University of Missouri, 1935.
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INSURANCE LAW IN MISSOURI
In Smith v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America,2 division one had before
it for the first time under these facts an aviation clause in a life policy,
limiting the benefit if the insured died in an airplane accident "'if the
insured is a pilot, officer or member of the crew of such aircraft, or is
operating or assisting in the operation of such aircraft, or is giving or
receiving any kind of training or instruction, or has any duties whatsoever
aboard such aircraft while in flight!' -3 The deceased, Colonel Smith, was
commandant of students at Randolph Field. He was an administrative
officer, not a flying instructor. He was under temporary duty orders to
proceed from Randolph Field to Fairfax Field and then to Lowry Field.
The orders designated him as copilot and he was the highest ranking
officer on the plane, which crashed into a mountain on the second leg of
the flight, from Fairfax to Lowry, killing all passengers. There was no
way of ascertaining from the wreckage what Colonel Smith's position or
those of the other occupants was at the time of the crash. Plaintiff con-
tended the burden was on defendant to show the insured, at the time of
his death, was actually engaged in performing the duites of the copilot.
The defendant contended the aviation clause became fully operative, upon
proof the insured was in the plane under orders and flight plan wherein
he was named as copilot. Plaintiff offered evidence of customs and
standard operating practices of the service to show that the insured
might not have actually been performing the duties of the copilot at the
time of the crash. But the court held that from plaintiff's own evidence
the trial court was correct in ruling as a matter of law that the insured,
at the time of death, was engaged in activities restricting the liability of
the defendant under the aviation clause. The clause was held clear and
not subject to construction. The court held that since there was no
evidence that the insured was not actually performing the duties of a
copilot (in the face of the written orders and flight plan designating
insured as copilot) the defendant did not have the burden of establishing
the deceased was actually at the controls and performing the copilot's
duties at the time of crash.
Kelso v. Kelso4 was a garnishment action by the judgment creditor
against the liability insurer growing out of an action for damages by one
brother against the other, where the insurance company denied coverage
2. 300 S.W.2d 435 (Mo. 1957).
3. Id. at 438.
4. 306 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. 1957).
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on the grounds the two brothers resided in the same household, that the
insured automobile was not fully owned by the insured, and that since
the insured had defaulted in the original trial there was no "actual trial"
within the meaning of the terms of the policy. The case was tried before
the court and in reviewing the case de novo the supreme court concluded
the weight of the evidence was that the two brothers were quite clearly
not members of the same household. As for the point that plaintiff was a
joint owner of the car because he stated on cross examination that he and
his brother each paid one half of the purchase price and owned the car
jointly, the court said that was of no significance in view of the fact the
certificate of title was in the name of the other brother, under the Mis-
souri decisions as to certificates of titles on automobiles. On the point
that the default judgment against the defendant brother was not the
result of an "actual trial", since it was by default, the court pointed out
that the insurance company had disclaimed any coverage because of the
household exclusion and refused to defend the original action and this was
a waiver of the so-called "actual trial" clause.
A fourth case is Baugh v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn.5 which went
to the supreme court from the St. Louis Court of Appeals6 on a conflict in
decisions of the courts of appeals as to the weight to be given hospital
records. We include this case under the insurance decisions, but it turns
largely on evidence questions arising from the insurer's defense in an
action on a life policy that the insured was not in sound health on the date
of the policy, contrary to his representations. The court held that uncon-
tradicted hospital records stating that the insured had congenital heart
disease were not conclusive on the issue. The court also held the applica-
tion was admissible, despite the recital in the policy that the policy con-
stituted the entire contract between the parties, because defendant had
alleged fraud in the procurement and defendant could therefore show it
had been fraudulently induced to enter into the contract.
5. 307 S.W.2d 660 (Mo. 1957).
6. 299 S.W.2d 554 (St. L. Ct. App. 1957).
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